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NOTE
THE “BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION” AND 
APPLYING ISSUE PRECLUSION TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Jonathan I. Tietz*
Inventions are tangible. Yet patents comprise words, and words are impre-
cise. Thus, disputes over patents involve a process known as “claim construc-
tion,” which formally clarifies the meaning of a patent claim’s words and, 
therefore, the scope of the underlying property right. Adversarial claim con-
struction commonly occurs in various Article III and Article I settings, such 
as district courts or the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). When these 
proceedings ignore each other’s claim constructions, a patent’s scope can be-
come inconsistent and unpredictable. The doctrine of issue preclusion could 
help with this problem. The Supreme Court recently reemphasized in B & B
Hardware v. Hargis Industries that administrative decisions can have issue 
preclusive effect. But district courts and the PTAB use formally different legal 
standards in claim construction, where the district court takes a narrower 
view of a patent’s scope. This Note contends that a claim construction deter-
mination made by the PTAB under the “broadest reasonable interpretation” 
standard should, indeed, be the broadest reasonable interpretation of a 
claim. To facilitate uniformity and public notice, issue preclusion should be 
applied such that the PTAB’s “broadest reasonable interpretation” is an outer 
interpretive bound of a patent’s scope in subsequent district court litigation.
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Introduction
The archetypical invention is a specific, tangible thing: an antibacterial 
chemical compound, a wine opener, a self-driving robot, a steam engine.1
But the patents that protect inventions are intangible and abstract2—
reducing a physical thing to words creates uncertainty. The law endeavors to 
make the scope of patents reasonably certain, but this is difficult because 
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); MPEP § 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
2. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) 
(“An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A verbal 
portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. . . . Things 
are not made for the sake of words, but words for things.” (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. 
United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
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language is unavoidably imprecise. Even with an established evidentiary hi-
erarchy, a settled interpretive procedure, and a body of case law governing 
interpretive principles, there is room to disagree. At nearly every patent-
related proceeding, an adjudicating body must determine what exactly the 
patent in question means.
Yet patent infringement is a strict-liability offense: it is more or less ir-
relevant whether an infringer knows ex ante the precise scope of a patent’s 
protectable subject matter.3 This scope is fuzzy, and it can vary across time, 
space, legal doctrine, and branch of the government. Ultimately, liability can 
turn on what seem like minutiae.
To add to the confusion, a patent might be held invalid in one setting 
and valid in another—for instance, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB) might find a patent invalid in one action while the International 
Trade Commission (ITC), in a second action, simultaneously finds it not on-
ly valid but infringed.4 Paul Gugliuzza calls these “Schrödinger[’s] patents,”5
evoking the famous quantum-mechanics thought experiment involving a 
simultaneously alive-and-dead cat.6 But there are other troubling opportuni-
ties for inconsistency beyond this extreme. For instance, a patent owner 
might ask a court to construe the scope of a patent narrowly when the validi-
ty of the patent is in question, so as to discourage the court from finding im-
permissible (unpatentable) overlap with inventions already in the public 
domain.7 The same patent owner might then argue for a broad construction 
when suing for infringement, hoping to expand the scope of protection.8
This might make strategic sense for a patent owner,9 but it is worrisome 
when considering that a patent is meant to involve a fair trade of limited ex-
clusivity (for the patentee) for disclosure of something useful (for society).10
That bargain is frustrated when the actual scope of a patent varies by the day 
and by the courtroom.
3. Direct infringement, that is. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
1920, 1926 (2015) (“Direct infringement is a strict-liability offense.”). Induced infringement 
does contain a scienter requirement, but this concerns only the existence of the patent, not the 
validity of its claims. See id. at 1928–30.
4. See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
5. Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 271, 272–73, 330 
(2016).
6. E. Schrödinger, Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik [The Current 
Situation in Quantum Mechanics], 23 Naturwissenschaften 807, 812 (1935); see also Schrö-
dinger’s Cat, Simple Eng. Wikipedia, https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schrödinger%27s_cat 
[https://perma.cc/GDS2-Z4FM].
7. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2197, 
2225, 2240–41 (2016) (describing problem of strategically inconsistent patent scope arguments 
between infringement and validity contexts).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966); Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s
Reproducibility Paradox, 66 Duke L.J. 845, 848 (2017) (“Patents serve as a quid pro quo: inven-
tors publicly disclose their inventions in return for exclusionary rights.”).
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But the law has a general solution for such inconsistencies: issue preclu-
sion (also known as collateral estoppel). Under this doctrine, a litigant gen-
erally has one—and only one—opportunity to try a given issue in court, and 
that issue is treated as already decided if raised later.11 Issue preclusion is es-
pecially appropriate in the context of property right delineation, including 
patent litigation.12 For instance, a patent owner is estopped from asserting a 
patent previously held invalid, even where the parties in the two actions are 
not mutual.13 Similarly, preclusion can apply to subsidiary issues, such as de-
terminations of patent meaning.14
Patents, however, play a key role in contentious administrative determi-
nations, and this presents a complication. Some judges, while comfortable 
with issue preclusion between courts, have been hesitant to recognize the 
principle in an administrative context, often articulating separation-of-
powers concerns.15 This is perhaps intuitive when an administrative body is 
acting outside its core institutional competence.16 But it is less so when an 
administrative body is charged with subject-matter expertise. The Supreme 
Court recently emphasized in B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, 
11. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (Am. Law Inst. 1982) (“When an is-
sue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the 
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent 
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”); see also Reese v. Veri-
zon Cal., Inc., 498 F. App’x 980, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[C]ollateral estoppel . . . prevents a 
plaintiff who previously litigated a claim . . . (and lost) from taking ‘another bite at the ap-
ple’ . . . .”).
12. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments ch. 3, topic 2, tit. E, intro. note (“The 
view has been expressed by some commentators that the applicability of issue preclusion ought 
perhaps to vary with the subject matter—broad in cases involving questions of property and 
status, where the need for stability is clearest . . . .”); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“Subject to the 
provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”); Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31 (2002) (“[A patent] is a proper-
ty right; and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear.”).
13. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349–50 (1971).
14. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
15. E.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1318 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (questioning “whether applying administrative preclusion to a core 
factual determination in a private-rights dispute comports with the separation of powers”); see 
also David A. Brown, Note, Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative Agency Determina-
tions: Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 817, 820 n.18 (1988) 
(noting more hesitation on issues of law).
16. See, e.g., Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Correction, 155 F.3d 950, 960 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(“Issue preclusion does not apply with equal force to all administrative proceedings . . . .”); 
Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e do not think 
that an administrative agency consisting of lay persons has the expertise to issue binding pro-
nouncements in the area of federal constitutional law. Our determination not to grant the 
Commission’s ruling preclusive effect is based on the considerations listed in Astoria—the 
rights at stake, as well as the power and relative adequacy of state procedures in this highly spe-
cialized area.”).
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Inc.17 that administrative determinations can, when appropriate, have pre-
clusive effects in later judicial proceedings if a two-step test is met.18 The im-
pact of B & B Hardware on patent law has not been resolved, but in general, 
courts have been reluctant to apply it.19 Yet B & B Hardware presents an op-
portunity to apply issue preclusion law to the administrative patent context. 
In doing so, courts can encourage consistency in interpretation of patent 
scope and vindicate the exclusivity–disclosure bargain that a patent is meant 
to strike.
This Note argues that claim construction by the PTAB—that is, admin-
istrative determinations of the scope of a given patent20—should give rise to 
issue preclusion, forming a preclusive outer bound of a patent’s scope. Part I 
explains how adjudication within various Article I and Article III proceed-
ings has created inconsistency in the scope of patent rights and notes the re-
luctance of district courts and ITC administrative judges to afford an issue 
preclusive effect to PTAB decisions. Part II explores the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in B & B Hardware, in which the Court emphasized a functional-
ist, two-step approach to applying issue preclusion to the decisions of ad-
ministrative bodies acting in an adjudicatory capacity. Part III applies this 
“B & B Two-Step” inquiry to the inter partes review (IPR) proceeding creat-
ed by the America Invents Act (AIA) and concludes that such preclusion is 
consistent with the AIA. Part IV proposes an outer-bounds preclusion theo-
ry consistent with the policy goals underlying claim construction and faithful 
to the differences underlying judicial and administrative determinations of 
claim scope.
I. Schrödinger’s Patent: How Can a Patent’s Meaning Change?
This Part describes the legal and structural causes of the “Schrödinger’s
patent” problem. Section I.A explores the role of claim construction in pa-
tent law. Section I.B highlights the policy considerations that underlie claim 
construction and also notes the public reliance interest on patent scope de-
terminations. Section I.C demonstrates how a patent may take on different 
meanings in different legal settings, due in part to inconsistencies in the 
weight district courts afford administrative claim construction decisions.
A. The Role of Claim Construction in Patent Law
In principle, a patent is a single document describing a single invention 
with clarity, staking out the inventor’s claimed property rights.21 This is a 
17. 135 S. Ct. at 1293.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description 
of the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
the art . . . to make and use the same . . . .” (emphasis added)); § 112(b) (“The specification shall 
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trade: an inventor makes public a clear and enabling disclosure of a new and 
useful invention, and in exchange, the government grants a temporary right 
to exclude others from practicing that invention.22 Clarity is a virtue here. 
Because patent infringement is a strict-liability offense,23 it is sound policy 
for the public to know ex ante whether a particular patent will be infringed 
by a given technology.24
In practice, clarity is difficult to achieve.25 Language is fuzzy, even when 
objective technical terms are employed.26 Indeed, the inherent complexity of 
technology,27 the ambiguity of language,28 the changing meanings of tech-
nical terms over time,29 and various idiosyncrasies of patent law30 all play a 
synergistic role in this uncertainty. Thus, despite efforts by Congress and the 
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” (emphasis added)).
22. See Sherkow, supra note 10, at 865–66 (discussing the disclosure “quid pro quo”); 
see also Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (“As a re-
ward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year 
monopoly . . . . But the quid pro quo is disclosure . . . in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in
the art to practice the invention . . . and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to 
warn the industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted.”).
23. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
24. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (remark-
ing that a patent must be clear enough to “appris[e] the public of what is still open to them,” so 
as to avoid a “zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the 
risk of infringement claims” (cleaned up)).
25. See, e.g., Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 607 F.3d 776, 783 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (“[C]laim construction frequently poses difficult questions over which reasonable minds 
may disagree . . . .”).
26. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31
(2002) (“Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a 
thing in a patent application. . . . The language in the patent claims may not capture every nu-
ance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty.”).
27. See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial 
Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of 
Professor Moore, 10 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 169, 174–82 (2009); Peter Lee, Patent Law 
and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2, 9–17 (2010).
28. See, e.g., Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“[I]t is not unusual for parties to offer competing definitions of even the simplest claim lan-
guage.”).
29. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 
Mich. L. Rev. 101 (2005) (exploring how courts approach patent claim interpretation when 
words change over time).
30. For instance, patent law has its own conventions for the meaning of “a” or “an”
(sometimes meaning “one,” see, e.g., N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 
1575–76 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and sometimes meaning “one or more,” see, e.g., Baldwin Graphic 
Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) as well as “comprising,” see
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 133 (2012) (characterizing synonymy of 
“comprise” and “include” as an “anomalous” feature of patent law).
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courts to improve clarity by legislation and judicial doctrine, ambiguity and 
uncertainty persist.31
Resolving the scope of a patent is essential to determining both in-
fringement and validity.32 Doing so determines which possible inventions 
are or are not included within the language of a patent’s claims.33 A claim is 
overbroad when it comprises subject matter previously available to the pub-
lic34—that is, where the public does not receive its end of the disclosure bar-
gain: a new and useful invention.
The legal process of determining what the words of a patent claim mean 
is known as “claim construction”35 and is in many ways analogous to statu-
tory construction.36 Claim construction determines the scope of the patent 
right. In the litigation context, claim construction is adversarial and subject 
to tensions even between alternative goals of the same party.37 This querying 
of the precise “metes and bounds”38 of a utility patent frequently arises not 
only in different actions but also in different jurisdictional settings. For in-
stance, the same patent owner might sue various defendants for individual 
instances of infringement. Or the same patent may appear in IPR proceed-
ings before the PTAB to contest validity, Section 337 investigations before 
the ITC to determine infringement by imported goods, or district court pro-
ceedings to resolve issues of infringement or validity.39
The question of a patent’s meaning is not only an ex post adjudicative 
consideration, because the inventing public must also look to patent claims 
to determine ex ante any risk of infringement. Somewhere between these ex 
post and ex ante considerations is patent examination, where the Patent Of-
31. See generally Gary M. Fox, Note, Understanding Nautilus’s Reasonable-Certainty 
Standard: Requirements for Linguistic and Physical Definiteness of Patent Claims, 116 Mich. L. 
Rev. 329 (2017) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the statutory definiteness 
requirement for patent claims).
32. See generally 3-8 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 8.01 (2018) (discussing 
patent claims and noting that patent claims serve the dual functions of “defin[ing] the inven-
tion for the purpose of applying the conditions of patentability” and “for the purpose of deter-
mining infringement”).
33. See id.
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
35. Or, alternatively, “claim interpretation.” E.g., 5-18A Chisum, supra note 32, § 18.01.
36. See generally 5-18A Chisum, supra note 32, §§ 18.01, 18.03 (discussing claim inter-
pretation); Christian E. Mammen, Patent Claim Construction as a Form of Legal Interpretation,
12 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 40 (2012) (comparing patent interpretation and legal 
interpretation).
37. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7, at 2225 (describing problem of patent owners 
arguing for inconsistent scope depending on the doctrinal context and cautioning that 
“[w]ithout a single integrated scope proceeding, there is no easy way to constrain this behav-
ior”).
38. See MPEP § 2173.02 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
39. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 278–87.
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fice looks at an application’s claims and determines their meaning as meas-
ured against already-known inventions, or “prior art.”40
B. Policy Considerations Underlying Claim Construction
Certain policy considerations in claim construction emphasize the im-
portance of clarity and uniformity in defining a patent’s scope. These include 
the public notice function of patents and the desire for uniformity. There are 
also equitable considerations. Third parties should be able to rely on prior 
adjudications determining the boundaries of patent rights. It is also desirable 
to prevent patent owners from molding their patents in real time based on 
the current legal context.
The public notice function aims to warn potential infringers and the 
public of the scope of a patent’s claims.41 This not only enables commercial-
izers to avoid liability but also marks the edge of protected patent space for 
innovators, signaling the frontiers at which patentable innovation can be 
pursued. Similarly, the normative goal of uniformity in patent interpretation 
has been articulated in the case law42 and in the literature.43 The Supreme 
Court has also emphasized the importance of clarity in the boundaries of pa-
tent rights—as with any property right.44 Together, these goals vindicate the 
fundamental exclusivity–disclosure trade in patent law.45
Cognizant of this trade, the Court has emphasized the need for the pub-
lic to know what is and what is not infringement, seeking to minimize any 
risk-laden “zone of uncertainty.”46 But the Court has also cautioned against 
strict literalism. For instance, the “doctrine of equivalents” seeks to avoid 
underprotection of patent rights.47 This, however, lessens certainty ex ante.48
40. See generally MPEP ch. 700 (providing procedure for examination of applications); 
1-3 Chisum, supra note 32, § 3.01.
41. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (invok-
ing public notice function and considerations of justice to the public in interpretation).
42. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (“[W]e see the 
importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allo-
cate all issues of construction to the court.”).
43. Scholars have advocated for consistent interpretations of a patent’s scope across 
time and across doctrines. See Lemley, supra note 29 (across time); Lemley & McKenna, supra
note 7 (across doctrines). This Note argues for consistent interpretations across branches of the 
government.
44. E.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 
(2002) (emphasizing that a patent is “a property right; and like any property right, its bounda-
ries should be clear”); Markman, 517 U.S. at 373 (“It has long been understood that a patent 
must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture . . . .”).
45. See Sherkow, supra note 10, at 865–66 (discussing this “quid pro quo”).
46. See supra note 24.
47. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 731–32 (“If patents were always interpreted by their literal 
terms . . . . [u]nimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the 
patent . . . .”).
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As a result, the public has a heightened reliance interest on legal decisions as 
to patent scope49—especially decisions that are formally part of the patent’s
prosecution history.50 Claim construction doctrine supports the public’s reli-
ance interest—for instance, a patent’s prosecution history is accorded heavy 
evidentiary weight by district courts.51
C. The Changing Meaning of a Single Patent in Various Settings
Despite these policy considerations, claim construction is not unified 
between proceedings, and so neither is patent scope. Questions of patent 
meaning arise in distinct adjudicatory bodies—namely, federal courts, the 
PTAB, and the ITC. These bodies all oversee questions of patent scope, and 
all patents in question are grounded in the same Patent Act.52 Yet, as de-
scribed below, each has a distinct set of procedural rules and a hesitation to 
apply preclusion. Hence, “Schrödinger’s patent” may arise because of con-
flicting decisions.53
Questions of patent meaning arise in various legal settings. Article III 
courts hear disputes over patent infringement claims, patent invalidity coun-
terclaims, and declaratory judgments of noninfringement or invalidity, 
among others. Article I bodies adjudicate patent rights too. For instance, 
Section 337 investigations before the ITC are accelerated inter partes pro-
ceedings in which the ITC determines whether imported articles infringe the 
intellectual property rights of domestic parties (and whether such articles are 
to be barred from import).54 The ITC is governed by its own rules of proce-
48. See id. (“The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces 
all equivalents to the claims described. It is true that the doctrine of equivalents renders the 
scope of patents less certain.” (citation omitted)).
49. See Lauren Drake, Note, Preventing Inequity: Extending Issue Preclusion to Claim 
Construction During Reexamination of Previously Litigated Patents, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 749, 
766 (2011) (“[The reliance] rationale extends to the public’s reliance on claim construction as 
determined during a Markman hearing. In the same way that public policy is promoted 
through the public’s ability to look only to non-disclaimed claims in the original patent to de-
termine the patent’s scope, public policy is also promoted through the public’s ability to look at 
a patent’s litigation history to determine the meaning of the patent’s claims.”).
50. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The 
claims, specification, and file history . . . constitute the public record of the patentee’s claim, a 
record on which the public is entitled to rely.”).
51. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“The 
prosecution history, which we have designated as part of the ‘intrinsic evidence,’ consists of the 
complete record of the proceedings before the PTO . . . . [T]he prosecution history provides 
evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” (citation omitted)).
52. The “Patent Act” generally refers to Title 35 of the U.S. Code.
53. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 287–92 (describing the nature of conflicting decisions 
between courts and the USPTO).
54. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012) (empowering the ITC to conduct Section 337 investiga-
tions).
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dure.55 But these rules resemble the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in many 
respects,56 and the ITC is subject to the same Federal Circuit body of patent 
law as any other tribunal.57 Section 337 investigations before administrative 
law judges are in many ways trial-like, requiring formal evidentiary hearings 
and involving exceptionally high-stakes, expensive disputes.58
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) also adjudi-
cates some patent disputes. The most prominent of the USPTO’s adjudica-
tive forms is IPR, an adversarial post-grant validity challenge procedure be-
fore the PTAB established by the AIA in 2012.59 Under the AIA, a party may 
petition the PTAB to institute an IPR; the party must establish that a patent 
is more likely than not invalid on the grounds of either novelty or obvious-
ness.60 If the PTAB institutes the IPR, the patent owner and petitioner par-
ticipate in an abbreviated but trial-like proceeding.61 The PTAB ultimately 
issues a “final written decision” on patentability, including claim construc-
tion when necessary.62 Final decisions of the PTAB are appealable to the 
Federal Circuit.63 As with ITC Section 337 investigations, proceedings at the 
PTAB follow a set of procedures that resemble the Federal Rules.64
Because of the procedural and substantive similarities of district court, 
ITC, and PTAB claim construction, issue preclusion would be aptly applied 
between these settings. The commonality of the patent right, the prospect of 
judicial efficiency, and the weight of the policy underpinnings of patent law 
55. See Section 337 Rules, U.S. Int’l Trade Commission, https://www.usitc.gov/
intellectual_property/section_337_rules.htm [https://perma.cc/AT43-6KLR].
56. See William P. Atkins & Justin A. Pan, An Updated Primer on Procedures and Rules 
in 337 Investigations at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 18 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. 
L.J. 105, 112 (2010) (observing that “[a]n investigation resembles private litigation and the 
Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules) are based on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure”).
57. See Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Commu-
nity Approach, 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 89, 98–104 (2015).
58. See generally Understanding Investigations of Intellectual Property Infringement and 
Other Unfair Practices in Import Trade (Section 337), U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, https://www.
usitc.gov/press_room/us337.htm [https://perma.cc/6N64-4QQC].
59. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat. 284, 299–305
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012)) (establishing inter partes review). Two similar 
procedures—so-called post-grant review (PGR) and covered business method review (CBM)—
operate in largely the same way, with differences in timing, grounds to challenge a patent, chal-
lengeable subject matter, and standing. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 281–85 (comparing and 
contrasting these proceedings).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). IPR is limited to the body of prior art consisting of pa-
tents and written publications. Id.
61. See id. § 314(a).
62. Id. § 318(a).
63. Id. §§ 141(c), 319.
64. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a) (2017) (adopting Federal Rules of Evidence as default 
rules in PTAB proceedings).
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all should encourage these bodies to share claim construction determina-
tions. Moreover, the doctrine of issue preclusion is a way the law generally 
endeavors to provide consistency between judgments, especially regarding 
property,65 and courts have applied the doctrine to each others’ claim con-
struction decisions where appropriate.66 Such preclusion should be expand-
ed to include the PTAB and ITC.67
Yet actual practice varies. For instance, district courts have no clear rule 
for claim construction following a proceeding at the PTAB for deference or 
for issue preclusion. Some courts give PTAB claim construction decisions 
“reasoned deference.”68 District courts sometimes use PTAB interpretations 
when doing so would “simplify the claim construction issues”69 or would 
provide guidance.70 Other courts use PTAB claim construction decisions 
merely for “comfort.”71 But some district courts consider PTAB claim con-
struction to be extrinsic evidence entitled to no deference at all.72 The Feder-
al Circuit has suggested in dicta that PTAB claim construction decisions do 
not satisfy the ordinary elements of issue preclusion.73 But in practice, at 
65. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
66. E.g., In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
67. This Note contends that issue preclusion as to claim construction would be appro-
priate. Preclusion as to patent validity is a separate question, and scholars such as Professor 
Paul Gugliuzza have generally cautioned against such preclusion because of the varying legal 
standards and burdens of proof on the issue of validity. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 289. 
Even so, despite a separate burden of proof, success in an effort at invalidation at the PTAB or 
in district court results in the same legal outcome: invalidation of the patent. One cannot assert 
a PTAB-cancelled patent (if such cancellation is affirmed on appeal) in a later district court 
action. Gugliuzza responds by noting that in such cases, it is the certificate of cancellation (re-
moving a patent owner’s standing), not the doctrine of issue preclusion, that bars the later ac-
tion. Id. at 312.
68. See, e.g., Contentguard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Nos. 2:13-CV-1112-
JRG, 2:14-CV-61-JRG, 2015 WL 8073722, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2015) (“On balance, Plain-
tiff has failed to justify departing from the PTAB’s construction, which is entitled to ‘reasoned 
deference.’ ” (quoting Maurice Mitchell Innovations, L.P. v. Intel Corp., No. 2:04-CV-450, 
2006 WL 1751779, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006)).
69. See, e.g., MASA LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 4:15-CV-00889-AGF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
60953, at *7–8 (E.D. Mo. May 9, 2016); Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd., 
No. 2:15-cv-00011-RSP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37502, at *13–14 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2016).
70. See, e.g., BTG Int’l Ltd. v. Actavis Labs. FI, Inc., No. 15-cv-5909 (KM)(JBC), 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157586, at *39 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2016) (noting that an IPR decision adopting a 
party’s claim construction “would be relevant, but not dispositive”).
71. E.g., Memory Integrity, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 3:15-cv-00262-SI, 2016 WL 1122718, 
at *16 n.9 (D. Or. Mar. 22, 2016) (“This Court uses the PTAB decision on this issue not for 
guidance, but for comfort.”).
72. E.g., Pragmatus AV, LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C-13-1176 EMC, 2014 WL 1922081, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (“[T]his Court owes no deference to the PTAB’s claim construc-
tion done as part of an inter partes review.”); Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Orthopaedic Hosp., 
No. 3:12-CV-299-CAN, 2016 WL 96164, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2016) (same).
73. See SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. DECA Int’l Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2016); see also Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 853 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. 
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least one district court has applied issue preclusion, finding that the ordinary 
elements of issue preclusion are met with respect to IPRs.74 Nevertheless, 
other courts have found that issue preclusion cannot apply.75
Concurrent proceedings in district courts and the PTAB are another ex-
ample of when claim construction judgments provide uncertain issue preclu-
sive effects.76 The PTAB may invalidate a patent during the pendency of a 
district court case, yet the district court may forge ahead and submit the 
question of infringement to the jury anyway.77 District courts often stay their 
proceedings pending resolution of a PTAB proceeding, but they are under 
no obligation to do so, and the PTAB cannot stay its own proceeding.78
What is the result of this inconsistency? Schrödinger’s patent. For ex-
ample, in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., a district court con-
sidered a question of patent infringement despite the defendant’s prior inval-
idation of the patent in an IPR.79 There, the court interpreted a separate 
statutory estoppel provision to prevent the patent challenger from raising 
any ground that could have been raised in the IPR.80 The lack of issue pre-
clusion and the presence of the statutory estoppel provision essentially 
meant that a patent challenger could lose in district court precisely because
they brought an action at the PTAB, despite winning there.81 In another ex-
ample, the ITC found infringement of a patent based on claims that had 
Cir. 2017) (noting that broader PTAB claim construction did not bind court but that issue was 
immaterial, as it would not have changed outcome)
74. See Princeton Dig. Image Corp. v. Konami Dig. Entm’t, Inc., Nos. 12-1461-LPS-CJB, 
13-335-LPS-CJB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92894, at *9–10 (D. Del. June 16, 2017).
75. See, e.g., Illumina, Inc. v. Qiagen, N.V., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
76. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 292–305.
77. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 
(D. Del. 2016) (applying statutory estoppel against party that had successfully invalidated pa-
tent at the PTAB).
78. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 273, 285–86 (observing that “[a]cross all post-
issuance proceedings, district courts grant motions seeking stays of litigation roughly sixty per-
cent of the time”).
79. 221 F. Supp. 3d at 553–54, 559 (also denying a stay).
80. Intellectual Ventures I, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 553–54, 559; see also 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) 
(2012) (“The petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in a final written decision . . .
may not assert . . . in a civil action . . . that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner 
raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.”).
81. See also Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 
337-TA-1042, at 1 (Nov. 8, 2017) (Respondent Ford’s Petition for Review of Order No. 30 on 
Complainant’s Motion for Summary Determination of Estoppel). In Certain Hybrid Electric 
Vehicles, complainant brought its ITC complaint after the PTAB finding of invalidity in an 
IPR. See id.
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been concurrently found unpatentable by the PTAB in an IPR; the ITC re-
fused to lift its exclusion order on the basis of the IPR decision.82
Patent scope, as a key aspect of a novelty or obviousness determination, 
can be determinative of patent validity.83 Thus, inconsistent scope means in-
consistent validity. A reluctance to apply issue preclusion to administrative 
decisions may frustrate not only the consistency goals of the doctrine but al-
so those of the patent system generally.
II. Administrative Issue Preclusion: 
The B & B Hardware Two-Step
This Part explores the doctrine of administrative issue preclusion. Sec-
tion II.A introduces the Court’s jurisprudence on the grounding of issue 
preclusion in administrative decisions, as most recently expressed in B & B
Hardware. Section II.B examines the reasoning underlying B & B Hardware
and argues that the Court has adopted a functionalist two-step inquiry. 
Then, in the context of the same case, Section II.C examines the Court’s ap-
plication of ordinary issue preclusion law, focusing in particular on how the 
Court evaluates the identity of legal issues and materiality of procedural dif-
ferences.
A. Administrative Issue Preclusion and the B & B Two-Step
In 2015, the Supreme Court reemphasized in B & B Hardware that ad-
ministrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity presumptively give rise to is-
sue preclusion if the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are satisfied.84 The 
Court formulated a two-part test, asking first whether there is an evident 
reason why Congress would not want particular administrative decisions to 
receive preclusive effect (B & B Step One) and second whether the ordinary 
elements of issue preclusion are met (B & B Step Two).
B & B Hardware was not the only time federal courts have found that 
administrative decisions can trigger issue preclusion.85 It is, however, the 
strongest articulation of the principle that unless expressly disclaimed, Con-
gress “presumptively intends that an agency’s determination . . . has preclu-
sive effect.”86 The Court has adopted the elements and underlying law of is-
82. Certain Network Devices, Related Software and Components Thereof (II), USITC 
Inv. No. 337-TA-945 (July 20, 2017) (Notice of Commission Determination to Deny Respond-
ent’s Petitions to Suspend or Temporarily Rescind Remedial Orders).
83. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (considering, with 
respect to patent validity, “the content of the prior art, the scope of the patent claim, and the 
level of ordinary skill in the art”).
84. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302–03 (2015).
85. E.g., Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986); United States v. Utah Constr. 
& Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421–22 (1966). See generally 18B Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters § 4475 (2d ed.), 
Westlaw (database updated April 2017).
86. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1304–05.
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sue preclusion from the Restatement of Judgments.87 Thus, aside from cer-
tain exceptions, “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and de-
termined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to 
the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action be-
tween the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”88
In B & B Hardware, Hargis Industries sought to register a trademark but 
ran into trouble when B & B Hardware filed an opposition proceeding before 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), alleging a likelihood of con-
fusion with its own trademark.89 The TTAB found Hargis’s trademark likely 
to cause confusion with that of B & B Hardware, and Hargis did not appeal 
the TTAB decision, despite availability of judicial review.90 B & B Hardware’s
opposition proceeding was concurrent with a district court infringement ac-
tion between the same parties, and B & B Hardware argued that Hargis was 
precluded in the district court from contesting likelihood of confusion as a 
matter of issue preclusion.91 Below, the Eighth Circuit held that differences 
between the two proceedings (especially legal standards and procedure) 
made issue preclusion inappropriate.92 The Supreme Court disagreed.
B. The Court’s Reasoning Underlying the B & B Two-Step
The Court’s reasoning underlying this question can be divided into two 
parts: (1) can an agency’s decisions ever provide a basis for issue preclusion? 
(“B & B Step One”); and, if so, (2) when can an agency’s decision provide 
such a basis? (“B & B Step Two”).
In establishing B & B Step One, the Court first asked whether an agency 
decision could ever ground issue preclusion.93 The Court articulated a broad 
policy goal of preventing relitigation and conserving time and resources,94
emphasizing that “a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly 
suffered.”95 The majority also acknowledged case law indicating that “where 
87. Id. at 1303.
88. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (Am. Law Inst. 1982) 
(alteration in original)).
89. Id. at 1299. The USPTO, under the Lanham Act, provides for an opposition pro-
ceeding before the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (TTAB) wherein the pending registration 
of a trademark may be challenged. See generally TMEP § 1503 (Oct. 2017).
90. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1302.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1298–99 (“Allowing the same issue to be decided more than once wastes liti-
gants’ resources and adjudicators’ time, and it encourages parties who lose before one tribunal 
to shop around for another. The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is designed 
to prevent this from occurring.”); see also id. at 1302–03.
95. Id. at 1302–03 (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 
107 (1991)).
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a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency, preclu-
sion . . . often applies.”96 Because issue preclusion was such a “well estab-
lished” principle at common law, the Court reiterated, courts may “take it as 
given” that when Congress has authorized agencies to resolve disputes, it 
“legislated with the expectation that the principle . . . will apply except when 
a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”97 Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court articulated a baseline presumption that issue preclusion applies to the 
decisions of administrative bodies authorized to resolve disputes unless 
Congress clearly articulated otherwise.98
Next, B & B Step Two. The Court asked “whether there is a categorical 
reason why [particular administrative] decisions can never meet the ordi-
nary elements of issue preclusion.”99 The Court emphasized that this inquiry 
is not defeated by the fact that sometimes the elements will not be met—it is 
aimed at whether they can never be.100 Thus, preclusion may apply in the 
administrative context if the ordinary elements of issue preclusion can be 
met.101 That is not to say that issue preclusion will always apply to the ad-
ministrative decisions in question, but that is also true of judicial decisions.
C. The Court’s Application of the Two-Step in B & B Hardware
Applying B & B Step One (“statutory purpose to the contrary”), the 
Court examined the Lanham Act to discern whether there was “an ‘evident’
reason why Congress would not want TTAB decisions to receive preclusive 
effect, even in those cases in which the ordinary elements of issue preclusion 
are met.”102 The Court found no such reason, noting that neither the Lan-
ham Act’s text nor structure “forbid issue preclusion.”103 Likewise, the Court 
noted that judicial review of TTAB decisions is provided for and under-
scored the point that a party who chooses not to appeal is subject to preclu-
sion, even if the conclusion would have been reviewed de novo.104 Turning 
to B & B Step Two, the court found no categorical reason why the “ordinary 
elements” of issue preclusion could never be met at the TTAB.105 The Eighth 
Circuit had held that there could never be identity of the issues106 between 
96. Id. at 1303.
97. Id. (quoting Astoria v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)).
98. Id. at 1302–05. This is referred to here as the “statutory purpose to the contrary”
test, or B & B Step One.
99. Id. at 1306–10. That is, the elements set out in the Restatement. Id.
100. Id. (“Although many registrations will not satisfy those ordinary elements, that does 
not mean that none will.”).
101. This question is referred to here as the “ordinary elements” test, or B & B Step Two.
102. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1305.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1306.
106. Identity of the issues is sometimes treated as a subsidiary consideration of the first 
element of preclusion from the Restatement (issue actually litigated), as in B & B Hardware,
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the TTAB and district courts because of different factors in assessing likeli-
hood of confusion.107 The Court disagreed. In differentiating between legal 
standards and underlying factors, the Court acknowledged that issues “are 
not identical if the second action involves application of a different legal 
standard, even though the factual setting of both suits may be the same.”108
But the Court also found that facially different issues, even with different 
statutory bases and underlying factors or tests,109 might be “in essence” the 
same legal standard.110 Looking to the factors underlying the TTAB and the 
Eight Circuit tests, the Court concluded that they were “not fundamentally 
different.”111
By emphasizing the “essence” of the underlying legal standards, the 
Court appears to have articulated a policy grounded more in functionalism 
than strict formalism, apparently concerned that technical differences in the 
wording of statutes might allow a party to practice “the very evils that issue 
preclusion helps to prevent.”112 In looking at whether the two legal standards 
were the same, the Court considered “the operative language,” the historical 
basis of each standard, and whether both tribunals apply the standards to 
achieve the same result.113 Rejecting the argument that the scope of the 
marks being compared typically differed, the Court declared that “a reason 
not to apply issue preclusion in some or even many cases” is not “a reason 
never to apply issue preclusion.”114
The Court also considered procedural differences between TTAB and 
district courts: namely, an absence of live testimony and narrower discov-
ery.115 The Court held that this did not constitute a categorical reason why 
the “ordinary elements” should never be satisfied.116 And even in individual 
but it is sometimes treated as a separate element, e.g., In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 
F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
107. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1306.
108. Id. (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4417, at 449 (2d ed. 2002)).
109. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Trademark and Unfair Competition 
Law 255 (6th ed. 2017) (comparing likelihood of confusion in TTAB (i.e., registration) and 
district court (i.e., infringement) contexts).
110. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1306–07.
111. Id. at 1307.
112. Id. (“More important, if federal law provides a single standard, parties cannot escape 
preclusion simply by litigating anew in tribunals that apply that one standard differently.”).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1308.
115. Id. at 1309. The Court further noted that “the agency’s procedures[ are in] large 
part . . . exactly the same as in federal court. For instance, although the scope of discovery in 
Board proceedings is generally narrower than in court proceedings—reflecting the fact that 
there are often fewer usages at issue—the TTAB has adopted almost the whole of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26.” Id. (cleaned up).
116. Id.
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hypothetical instances where procedural differences might be material, the 
exceptions of ordinary preclusion law could provide an equitable safety 
valve.117
Thus, the Supreme Court in B & B Hardware formulated a two-part test 
for whether administrative bodies acting in a quasi-judicial capacity may 
ground issue preclusion. The test is remarkably inclusive, relying on a strong 
default presumption of preclusion based on functionalist considerations but 
fine-tuned by the equitable safety valves of ordinary preclusion law. But in 
the few years since the Court’s decision, B & B Hardware has not yet seen 
broad application outside the trademark context. As the next Part explores, 
however, extension to the patent context is especially appropriate.
III. Applying the B & B Two-Step to Claim Construction in 
Inter Partes Review
This Part applies the B & B Hardware Two-Step to the administrative 
patent claim construction context. Can PTAB claim construction decisions 
in an IPR proceeding ground issue preclusion? The question is twofold. 
First, Section III.A considers whether Congress intended PTAB decisions not
to have preclusive effect and finds no “statutory purpose to the contrary.”
Second, Section III.B examines in which situations (if any) PTAB claim con-
struction decisions might satisfy the elements of issue preclusion. Although 
Congress does not seem to have indicated that preclusion should categorical-
ly not apply, some aspects of IPR point to the need for a specially tailored so-
lution.
A. B & B Step One: No Statutory Purpose to the Contrary
Through the lens of B & B Step One, the statutory context and policy 
considerations underlying the IPR process indicate no “statutory purpose to 
the contrary” regarding issue preclusion.
What can be discerned from the text and structure of the AIA?118 First, 
the AIA affirmatively grants the PTAB authority to cancel an already-issued 
patent.119 Second, it grants the USPTO authority to set the legal standards 
through promulgation of regulations.120 Congress structurally limited the 
ability of courts to relitigate IPR issues. Congress also explicitly provided for 
judicial review of PTAB decisions by the Federal Circuit, but not district 
117. See id. The exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion appear in the Restate-
ment and include, for instance, unavailability of review of the first judgment, the need for a 
new determination of law in light of an intervening change in context, differences in quality or 
extensiveness of procedures, serious differences in the burden of persuasion, and considera-
tions of public interest. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (Am. Law Inst. 1982).
118. Cf. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1302–06 (examining text and structure of Lanham
Act).
119. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012).
120. Id. § 316(a).
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courts.121 In addition to limiting the pathways for review of final decisions, 
the AIA withdraws from judicial review the PTAB’s decisions to institute 
IPRs at all.122 On the whole, this illustrates a structure designed by Congress 
to limit judicial oversight and bolster the competence of the PTAB. Although 
this does not explicitly endorse issue preclusion, it is far from a “statutory 
purpose of the contrary.”
The AIA affirmatively provides for some preclusion, establishing that a 
petitioner may not assert in a civil action or ITC investigation “any ground 
that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised” during the IPR.123
Essentially, this has the effect of preventing a challenger from repeating the 
same arguments in a later action. The significance of the statutory reference 
estoppel provisions might be read in several ways. Under a permissive read-
ing, one could view them as a signal of Congress’s affirmative conferral of 
general competence regarding preclusion upon the PTAB. A neutral reading 
might view them as simply a choice-of-forum provision. But a restrictive 
reading might view them as an enumeration of the only kinds of preclusion 
permitted.124 Indeed, statutory reference estoppel has been construed to be 
narrow in scope,125 and there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial re-
view.126 Thus, this jurisprudence might caution against the expansion of pre-
clusion beyond that enumerated.127 The presumption that Congress intends 
preclusion “absent a contrary indication,”128 however, suggests a pro-
preclusion reading. That is, Congress does not need to explicitly endorse 
administrative estoppel if it has not forbidden it.
Additional considerations support the competence of PTAB decisions to 
have preclusive effect. First, as a matter of legislative purpose, IPR was in-
121. Id. §§ 141(c), 319.
122. Id. § 314(d).
123. Id. § 315(e)(2). For the purpose of this Note, this will be referred to as “statutory 
reference estoppel.” This is because § 315(e)(2) operates with respect to a combination of a 
particular statutory ground (i.e., novelty or obviousness) and particular prior art references 
(i.e., a particular set of patents and printed publications). See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC 
v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 554 (D. Del. 2016) (estopping challenger, on § 315(e)(2) 
grounds, from raising obviousness based on three specific prior art patents).
124. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 30, at 107–11 (expressio unius).
125. For instance, because of AIA text limiting statutory reference estoppel to grounds 
that could have been raised “during” IPR, statutory reference estoppel does not apply to an 
invalidity ground included in an IPR petition but not instituted. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Au-
tomated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016); HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., 
LLC, 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
126. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016).
127. Some courts have pushed back against this, hesitant to give a “second bite at the ap-
ple.” E.g., Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC v. IBM, No. 13-2072 (KAJ), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28461, at *30 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017).
128. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302–03 (2015).
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tended to be an alternative to litigation.129 If relitigation of the same issues is 
permitted in both an IPR and district court context, the actions are duplica-
tive, not alternative.130 Of course, the argument could be made that the claim 
construction issue is not the same, but as discussed later, this does not fore-
close preclusion; it simply changes its character.131 Second, the PTAB is also 
of technical competence, which is important to resolving the meaning of 
claim terms. Indeed, deference to agencies is most appropriate within their 
area of expertise—especially when it comes to technical matters132—and ad-
ministrative issue preclusion doctrine considers regulatory context.133 The 
USPTO has special expertise in “resolving patent claims”134 and has the 
“primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material.”135 IPR pro-
ceedings are presided over by administrative patent judges who resemble an 
intermediate between technically qualified patent examiners and legally 
qualified judges.136
Two policy considerations underlying patent law also support issue pre-
clusion: the public notice function of patents and the desire for uniformity. 
The notice function aims to warn potential infringers and the public of the 
scope of the patent’s claims.137 This supports the conclusiveness of PTAB de-
terminations, such that a potentially infringing practitioner may rely on all 
proper adjudications of a patent’s meaning. The very fact that claim con-
struction consists of questions of law and not questions for the jury also re-
flects a fundamental concern for uniformity in patent interpretation.138 As a 
doctrine, issue preclusion generally furthers uniformity by reducing the 
number of conflicting alternative judgments on a given issue.139
The close integration of the USPTO’s administrative authority and pa-
tent rights has also led to two judicial estoppel doctrines—prosecution histo-
129. E.g., Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“With its en-
actment of the AIA in 2011, Congress created IPRs to provide ‘quick and cost effective alterna-
tives to litigation.’ ” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011))).
130. See, e.g., ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Moore, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“Congress intended the 
IPR/CBM/reexam route to be an alternative to district court litigation of certain validity issues, 
not duplicative of them.”).
131. See infra Section III.B.3.
132. E.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
133. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 29, 83(4) (Am. Law Inst. 1982).
134. E.g., Magna Donnelly Corp. v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc., No. 4:06-CV-126, 2007 WL 
772891, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2007).
135. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
136. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
137. See supra note 41.
138. See supra note 42.
139. See generally Monica Renee Brownewell, Note, Rethinking the Restatement View 
(Again!): Multiple Independent Holdings and the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion, 37 Val. U. L. 
Rev. 879, 920 (2003) (observing that “collateral estoppel, as a procedural rule, seeks to create 
uniformity in judgments”).
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ry estoppel140 and prosecution disclaimer.141 The doctrines limit the scope of 
a patent’s claims based on statements made by a patent applicant to secure 
the patent’s allowance. This implies that organs of the USPTO, including the 
PTAB, are generally competent to preclude. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has 
applied prosecution disclaimer against a patent owner on the basis of state-
ments made during an IPR,142 invoking the public notice function of pa-
tents.143
This administrative context, however, also highlights a possible strike 
against issue preclusion based on the materiality of a distinction between pa-
tent litigation and patent prosecution. Some courts have applied such a pros-
ecution disclaimer because they regard IPR as part of patent prosecution.144
Indeed, a patent claim may (theoretically) be amended during an IPR,145 the 
same legal standards are used as are during patent examination,146 and the 
proceeding occurs under the ambit of the USPTO. If an IPR is formally pa-
tent prosecution, then is the PTAB truly “acting in a judicial capacity” as 
contemplated under B & B Hardware?147 Is that more akin to legislative ex 
ante rulemaking than ex post administrative adjudication?148 The Federal 
Circuit seems to view IPR somewhere in the middle, a creature that has 
characteristics of both prosecution and litigation,149 but the Supreme Court 
140. See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
733–35 (2002) (discussing prosecution history estoppel).
141. See generally Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Shire Pharm., Inc., 839 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (defining prosecution disclaimer).
142. Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding 
that statements made by patent owner during IPR can be relied on to support finding of prose-
cution disclaimer during claim construction).
143. Id. at 1360 (“Extending the prosecution disclaimer doctrine to IPR proceedings will 
ensure that claims are not argued one way in order to maintain their patentability and in a dif-
ferent way against accused infringers.”).
144. See id. Patent “prosecution” refers to the administrative process by which a patent 
application is filed at and examined by the USPTO and is essentially “a series of negotiations 
between the examiner and the inventor.” See generally Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitz-
gerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy 58–62 (7th ed. 2017).
145. It could be argued that the ability to amend is essentially illusory, such motions al-
most never being granted. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 284 n.87 (noting that PTAB only 
granted six motions to amend in three-and-a-half years). Recent Federal Circuit case law, how-
ever, suggests a trajectory toward a patent owner’s ability to more readily amend claims during 
an IPR. See, e.g., Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (allocating 
burden of proof of unpatentability of amended claims in IPR to petitioner).
146. Examination also uses the BRI standard. See MPEP § 2111 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, 
Jan. 2018).
147. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015).
148. See Wright et al., supra note 85, § 4475 (discussing balance of adjudicatory and 
legislative elements in administrative proceedings with respect to preclusion).
149. Compare Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(“[S]tatements made by a patent owner during an IPR proceeding . . . can be considered for 
claim construction and relied upon to support a finding of prosecution disclaimer.”), with PPC 
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has recently noted that IPR is adjudicative.150 Indeed, the fact that revocation 
of a patent right is at stake points to an adjudicative purpose of claim con-
struction. Additionally, the existence of the two judicial estoppel doctrines 
seems to suggest that the prosecution–litigation distinction is not material.
Thus, the structure and text of the AIA do not indicate a “statutory pur-
pose to the contrary.” And although an IPR shares some characteristics of 
patent examination, it bears more structural features in common with an ad-
versarial quasi-judicial proceeding. Moreover, the PTAB, as an arm of the 
technically qualified USPTO, is uniquely capable to make findings on the 
technical meaning of a patent’s claims. Policy considerations—particularly, 
the public notice doctrine and uniformity—similarly support the application 
of issue preclusion to claim construction specifically. Although there is clear-
ly no explicit endorsement by Congress, in the absence of a clear disapproval, 
it is reasonable to go with the default under B & B Step One in favor of ad-
ministrative preclusion.
B. B & B Step Two: Ordinary Elements Could Be Satisfied
B & B Step Two asks whether the Restatement’s “ordinary elements” of 
issue preclusion are satisfied. The elements include whether (1) ”an issue of 
fact or law is actually litigated” (including identity of the issues); (2) that is-
sue is “determined by a valid and final judgment;” and (3) ”the determina-
tion is essential to the judgment.”151 These ordinary elements must then be 
balanced against any equitable exceptions to issue preclusion that arise.152
Application of B & B Step Two reveals that the “ordinary elements” test will 
often be largely satisfied due to the similarity between PTAB and judicial 
claim construction. Indeed, only the doctrinal difference in legal standards 
between claim constructions in district courts and IPRs is a potentially sig-
nificant barrier.
1. General Application of the “Ordinary Elements” Test
To begin, whether a claim construction is “actually litigated” in an IPR is 
seemingly straightforward: was a claim construction determination made? If 
Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 756 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“IPRs . . . are litigation-like contested proceedings before the Board.”).
150. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353–54 (2018) (observing that IPR 
“looks a good deal more like civil litigation,” including “many of the usual trappings”); Oil 
States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1378 (2018) (noting 
that although IPR is not an exercise of the judicial power, it “includes some of the features of 
adversarial litigation”); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (describ-
ing IPR and the district court as alternative fora for “review and adjudication of patent 
claims”).
151. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1303 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments §§ 27, 28 (Am. Law Inst. 1982)).
152. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28. Such equitable exceptions might 
include the materiality of procedural differences in the two settings, for instance.
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so, the issue of claim construction was litigated. Indeed, claim construction 
is required in a petitioner’s brief before the PTAB, a patent owner has the 
opportunity to supply its own claim construction arguments, and the PTAB 
decides claim construction in its final written decision.153 Two exceptions do 
arise. First, the PTAB may decide a claim term does not actually need con-
struction and declare that it takes its “plain and ordinary meaning.”154 In 
such a case, the parties would be free in a subsequent proceeding to litigate a 
precise construction. Second, because certain grounds of invalidity cannot be 
asserted in an IPR (e.g., indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112), certain claim 
construction arguments cannot actually be advanced in an IPR.155 This does 
not affect issue preclusion against patent owners, but it does caution against 
its application against petitioners in certain cases. Importantly, however, dif-
ferences in legal standards can nullify this first element, as discussed below 
in Section III.B.3.156
Because final validity or infringement judgments in patent litigation rest 
on claim construction, claim construction determinations can frequently be 
essential for preclusion purposes.157 Determination of essentiality of claim 
constructions to the final judgment is seemingly no different before the 
PTAB than across subsequent district court actions.158
153. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (2017) (requiring that petition propose claim construction); 
see also id. § 41.120 (allowing for patent owner response); id. § 42.100(b) (requiring claims be 
given their broadest reasonable construction).
154. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012) 
(“Regarding the need for a claim construction, where appropriate, it may be sufficient for a 
party to provide a simple statement that the claim terms are to be given their broadest reasona-
ble interpretation . . . .”).
155. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (establishing that a petitioner in an inter partes review 
may challenge a claim of a patent only on the basis of novelty under § 102 or obviousness un-
der § 103). For instance, the PTAB cannot find a claim indefinite under § 112 during an IPR. 
Merges & Duffy, supra note 144, at 310. This should not preclude a later court from seeking 
an interpretation broader than the IPR’s claim construction if a § 112 invalidity argument is 
advanced in a later proceeding.
156. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. c (discussing evaluation of 
the dimensions of an issue). This identity-of-the-issues requirement is often formulated sepa-
rately. See, e.g., In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting 
that issue preclusion requires “(1) identity of the issues in a prior proceeding; (2) the issues 
were actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issues was necessary to the resulting judg-
ment; and, (4) the party defending against preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issues” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
157. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 85 F. App’x 765, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(applying issue preclusion to claim construction where the “record show[ed] that the district 
court’s determination of the meaning of identical terms in the earlier case was essential to the 
judgment in that case”); cf. RF Del., Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1261 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that claim construction issued in interlocutory order was not suffi-
ciently final to permit issue preclusion).
158. See generally Matthew A. Ferry, Different Infringement, Different Issue: Altering Issue 
Preclusion as Applied to Claim Construction, 19 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 361, 375–77 (2011) 
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Judgments are generally “valid and final” for issue preclusion purposes 
when they constitute a deliberated, nontentative decision of an issue, even 
prior to any appeal.159 Determining whether an IPR decision constitutes a 
“valid and final judgment” requires a more careful analysis given the unique 
statutory context of IPR proceedings. At the conclusion of an IPR, the PTAB 
first issues a “final written decision” on patentability of the claims for which 
review was instituted.160 The final written decision may be appealed to the 
Federal Circuit.161 If an appeal is not successful (or does not happen), the 
USPTO issues a certificate of cancellation of the challenged claims, removing 
a patent owner’s standing to sue.162
Procedurally, a “final written determination” by the PTAB is probably 
“final” for preclusion purposes.163 A PTAB written decision is “final” in that 
a successfully challenged claim will be cancelled if a patent owner loses and 
fails to appeal to the Federal Circuit (or does appeal but loses there).164 And 
even if an appeal is pending, the norm in federal courts is that judgments are 
generally immediately effective for preclusion purposes notwithstanding an 
appeal.165 The Supreme Court has seemingly suggested a baseline presump-
tion that “ordinary preclusion law” is imported nearly wholesale into the 
administrative context.166 One procedural facet of IPR, however, suggests 
that this norm might not apply in this particular context: whereas patent in-
validity arising from district courts is effective immediately upon a judgment 
(requiring no action by the USPTO), a successful IPR results in a cancella-
tion certificate only after resolution of any appeal.167 In the reexamination 
procedure that IPR replaced, finality for statutory reference estoppel did not 
occur until exhaustion of an appeal.168 But the plain text of the AIA suggests 
that statutory reference estoppel attaches as of the “final written decision”
(reviewing concept of essentiality of claim construction in district court issue preclusion con-
text).
159. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 & cmt. g (“[T]he court should de-
termine that the decision . . . was adequately deliberated and firm, even if not final in the sense 
of forming a basis for a judgment already entered.”).
160. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
161. Id. §§ 141(c), 319.
162. Id. § 318(b).
163. Cf. Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he finality 
requirement is less stringent for issue preclusion than for claim preclusion.” (quoting Christo 
v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000))); Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 13 cmt. g (“The test of finality . . . is whether the conclusion in question is procedurally defi-
nite . . . .”).
164. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(b).
165. See, e.g., Dana, 342 F.3d at 1323; Rice v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 998 F.2d 997, 999 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The law is well settled that the pendency of an appeal has no effect on the 
finality or binding effect of a trial court’s holding.”); SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
166. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302–06 (2015).
167. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(b).
168. See Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 642–43 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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before appeal.169 Thus, the certificate, which also confirms patentable claims 
and any amendments, may represent the point of finality or may simply rep-
resent administrative bookkeeping.170 Indeed, a curious result emerges if the 
PTAB’s decision results in statutory reference estoppel171 but does not result 
in issue preclusion. A successful petitioner is estopped from challenging a pa-
tent in a parallel litigation; until an appeal is resolved, the defeated patent 
owner may continue to assert the patent, safe from any assault on the 
grounds already used to invalidate it before the PTAB.172 Accordingly, in the 
interests of uniformity, finality should attach as of the final written decision.
2. Differences in Procedure Do Not Warrant a 
Categorical Exception to Preclusion
Even when an issue has been “actually litigated,” ordinary preclusion law 
provides an exception upon a showing of material procedural differences.173
This highlights one seemingly significant objection to affording preclusive 
effect to IPR decisions: in some respects, the procedures are quite different. 
For instance, district court case schedules are much longer—usually by a few 
years—than an IPR, which must be completed within twelve months of insti-
tution.174 IPR proceedings lack the summary judgment procedures and set-
tlement options available in district courts.175 The array of legal grounds of 
169. Reading the PTAB final-decision statute, 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (“If an inter partes re-
view is instituted . . . the [PTAB] shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patenta-
bility of any patent claim challenged . . . .” (emphasis added)), in conjunction with the refer-
ence estoppel statute, id. § 315(e)(2) (“The petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in 
a final written decision under section 318(a) . . . may not assert . . . in a civil action . . . that the 
claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during 
that inter partes review.” (emphasis added)), strongly suggests this result under ordinary prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 30, at 170–73 (presumption 
of common usage). Overall, courts remain split on when exactly finality attaches to PTAB deci-
sions in an IPR for statutory reference estoppel purposes. See Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 
808 F.3d 829, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ignite USA, LLC v. Pac. Mkt. Int’l, LLC, No. 14 C 856, 2014 
WL 2505166, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2014). But see Va. Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. 
Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 713, 752–53 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 614 F. App’x 503 
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
170. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(b).
171. See supra note 123.
172. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
173. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(3) (Am. Law Inst. 1982) (noting that 
preclusion is inappropriate where “[a] new determination of the issue is warranted by differ-
ences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts”).
174. See Michael J. Flibbert & Maureen D. Queler, 5 Distinctions Between IPRs and Dis-
trict Court Patent Litigation, Finnegan (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.finnegan.com/en/
insights/5-distinctions-between-iprs-and-district-court-patent-litigation.html [https://perma.cc/
9D8W-YKEK].
175. Id.
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patent validity that may be raised are much fewer.176 The scope of discovery 
is much narrower in an IPR, but only in an IPR may a patent owner move to 
amend claims.177 And while district courts use live testimony, the PTAB pre-
fers written declarations with cross-examination of deponents.178
These procedural differences matter less when it comes to claim con-
struction. Restricted discovery and absence of live testimony have little rele-
vance. Under patent law doctrine, a standard evidentiary hierarchy is fol-
lowed, with the most important evidence being the patent’s specification and 
plain meanings of a claim term—both available in an IPR.179 Additionally, 
burden-of-proof differences are irrelevant to claim construction, which is a 
question primarily of law, albeit based on underlying factual determina-
tions.180 Overall, these differences echo those raised (and rejected as insuffi-
cient) in B & B Hardware.181
Even where IPR procedure differs, mere difference does not defeat pre-
clusion unless there is a categorical “reason to doubt the quality, extensive-
ness, or fairness” of the proceeding.182 The Court has offered little guidance 
on what such a categorical reason might be, but it has indicated that in such 
a case the burden of persuasion rests with a party claiming unfairness.183
Importantly, the USPTO has generally adopted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence for IPRs.184 The Federal Circuit has also generally found procedural 
176. Id. For example, district court issues include infringement, various affirmative de-
fenses, and any ground of invalidity, whereas IPRs are limited to unpatentability on the 
grounds of novelty or obviousness.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (detailing evidentiary hierarchy); see also id. at 1315 (“[T]he specification is always high-
ly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide 
to the meaning of a disputed term.” (cleaned up)).
180. E.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015); AK Steel 
Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 234 F. Supp. 2d 711, 718 n.6 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (noting that as a ques-
tion of law, evidentiary burdens generally do not apply to claim construction).
181. Cf. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1309 (2015) (“No 
one disputes that the TTAB and district courts use different procedures. Most notably, district 
courts feature live witnesses. Procedural differences, by themselves, however, do not defeat is-
sue preclusion. Equity courts used different procedures than did law courts, but that did not 
bar issue preclusion.”).
182. Id. at 1309 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979)); see 
also id. (“Rather than focusing on whether procedural differences exist—they often will—the 
correct inquiry is whether the procedures used in the first proceeding were fundamentally 
poor, cursory, or unfair.”).
183. Id.
184. 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a) (2017) (adopting Federal Rules of Evidence as default for PTAB 
proceedings); cf. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1300 (noting that TTAB procedures “are largely 
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence”).
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sufficiency at the PTAB,185 and the Supreme Court has endorsed the fairness 
of using different legal standards in IPR than in a district court.186 Further, 
the PTAB is governed by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 
meant to ensure procedural fairness.187
Granted, some do doubt the procedural fairness of the PTAB—
sometimes colorfully.188 But if procedures for claim construction at IPR are 
categorically unfair, this raises bigger concerns about the constitutionality of 
IPR in general.189 Conversely, if the procedure at the PTAB is sufficiently fair 
for patent cancellation, it should seemingly be enough for preclusion regard-
ing claim scope. Additionally, if in individual cases the PTAB procedure is 
inadequate, the ordinary law of issue preclusion “already accounts for those 
‘rare’ cases where a ‘compelling showing of unfairness’ can be made”—an 
equitable safety valve.190
3. Identity of the Issues: A Stumbling Block?
Perhaps the biggest concern in application of preclusion is the identity 
of the issues. If the issues are not actually the same, preclusion does not ap-
ply.191 Formally, the PTAB and district courts apply two different legal 
standards in claim construction. The PTAB uses the “broadest reasonable 
185. See, e.g., Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
rules and practices of the Board generally protect against loss of patent rights without the re-
quired notice and opportunity to respond.”).
186. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (2016).
187. See, e.g., Belden, 805 F.3d at 1080 (characterizing inter partes review as formal adju-
dication subject to the APA); 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012) (formal adjudications); Rapp v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Treasury, 52 F.3d 1510, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Section 554 of the APA requires proce-
dural fairness in the administrative process.”); United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 919 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (characterizing APA’s adjudicatory rules as “designed to ensure procedural fair-
ness”).
188. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, The Only Solution for the Transgressions of the PTAB Is to 
Disband This Runaway Tribunal, IPWatchdog (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2017/09/11/solution-ptab-disband-runaway-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/6562-P3AR] (ques-
tioning procedural sufficiency of the PTAB and opining that “the PTAB is a kangaroo 
court . . . that you might expect in a third world nation suffering from a complete collapse of 
the judiciary”).
189. However, the constitutionality of IPR was recently upheld by the Supreme Court as 
not contrary to Article III. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. 
Ct. 1365 (2018). Only two justices—Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts—dissented, la-
menting the majority’s opinion as “a retreat from Article III’s guarantees.” Id. at 1386 (Gor-
such, J., dissenting).
190. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1309 (2015) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, cmt. g & j (Am. Law Inst. 1982)).
191. This is often treated as an independent enumerated element of issue preclusion. See
supra note 106.
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interpretation,”192 whereas district courts use the narrower Phillips standard, 
which inquires of a word’s meaning “to a person of ordinary skill in the 
art.”193
Given their similarity in both theory and practice, the two standards 
seem, at first, essentially the same. The Phillips standard prioritizes giving 
words their “ordinary and customary meaning . . . to a person of ordinary 
skill in the art” informed by the “context of the entire patent, including the 
specification.”194 Likewise, the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) seeks 
“the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as 
they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into ac-
count whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may 
be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specifica-
tion.”195 In implementing Phillips, courts turn to “the words of the claims 
themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and 
extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of 
technical terms, and the state of the art.”196 But the specification and words 
of the claims themselves are usually dispositive.197 Indeed, the main consid-
erations of the Phillips standard—consistency with the specification, the per-
spective of one of ordinary skill, and preference for plain meaning—are also 
integral to the BRI.198
What, then, is the difference? Essentially, a district court seems to read a 
patent in the way it thinks a skilled practitioner probably would (perhaps the 
“most likely” reasonable interpretation), whereas the PTAB seems to read a 
patent in the most expansive way a skilled practitioner might (the “broadest”
reasonable interpretation). 199 Practical differences do occur.200 For example, 
“computer display window” was construed more broadly in an IPR (the por-
192. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) 
(2017) (requiring that a patent claim “shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in 
light of the specification of the patent in which it appears”).
193. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
194. Id.
195. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 
F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
196. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
197. See supra note 179.
198. See Laura E. Dolbow, Note, A Distinction Without a Difference: Convergence in 
Claim Construction Standards, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1071, 1097–98 (2017) (“[G]iven the similarity 
of the guiding principles, interpreters apply many of the same interpretation rules to construe 
claims under both the Phillips and BRI standards. Some specific interpretation rules common 
to both . . . are used with particular frequency.”).
199. But the theoretical differences in the standards are vague at best. See id. at 1083–84.
200. But see id. at 1089, 1100–03 (suggesting that differences arise from “inherent ambi-
guities in interpretation or litigant behavior rather than a difference between the legal stand-
ards”).
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tion of a display screen in which a set of information is displayed) than in a 
prior district court action (also requiring a graphical user interface).201
As a matter of law, the PTAB’s BRI may be the same as the Phillips con-
struction or may be broader; it may not be narrower.202 Thus, the two are 
subject to a one-directional legal relationship, but they may also come out 
the same way in a particular instance.203 Both require consistency with the 
patent specification,204 and the Federal Circuit has clarified that the PTAB is 
not to adopt the “broadest possible interpretation.”205
Moreover, B & B Hardware implies that sufficient identity of the issues 
may exist when two purportedly different legal standards formally rooted in 
different texts are nonetheless “in essence” the same standard.206 For exam-
ple, in B & B Hardware, although district court and TTAB standards typical-
ly examined different breadth of a mark’s usage,207 this question of narrow or 
broad usage was not present in the case at hand because the TTAB had con-
201. Compare Rackspace Hosting, Inc. v. Rotatable Techs. LLC, No. IPR2013-00248, 
2014 WL 4732552, at *4–6 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 19, 2014), with Rotatable Techs. LLC v. Nokia, No. 
2:12-CV-265-JRG, 2013 WL 3992930, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2013).
202. Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The 
broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may be the same as or broader than the con-
struction of a term under the Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”).
203. E.g., Dolbow, supra note 198 (arguing based on empirical evidence that the different 
claim construction standards have “largely converged in practice”); see also Timothy R. 
Holbrook, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Evolving Impact on Claim Construction, 24 
Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 301, 330–31 (2016). Dolbow developed a database of IPR final written 
decisions and showed that in practice, “the BRI operates in a circular manner, largely citing 
legal authority that originates from the Phillips regime.” Dolbow, supra note 198, at 1084.
204. Compare In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (clarifying 
that the BRI “is an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes 
his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specifica-
tion.’ ” (quoting In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997))), with Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Importantly, the person of ordinary 
skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim 
in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the speci-
fication.”).
205. E.g., Smith Int’l, 871 F.3d at 1383.
206. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1306–07 (2015) (“For 
one thing, the factors are not fundamentally different, and ‘[m]inor variations in the applica-
tion of what is in essence the same legal standard do not defeat preclusion.’ ” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 312 n.9 (2011))). The comments to the 
Restatement also suggest that identity-of-issue requirements are not strict and formalistic. See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1982) (“When there is a 
lack of total identity between the particular matter presented . . . there are several factors that 
should be considered . . . for example: Is there a substantial overlap between the evidence or 
argument . . . ? Does the new evidence or argument involve . . . the same rule of 
law . . . ? . . . How closely related are the claims involved . . . ?”).
207. See supra note 109.
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sidered the mark’s actual use.208 There, the Court concluded that for identi-
cal uses, the question was essentially the same between the TTAB and a dis-
trict court.209 So differing breadth was arguably absent. This is not necessari-
ly so between the PTAB and district courts. In addition to different 
nomenclature and definitions, varying policy goals underlie the two. The 
district court standard seeks to divine the construction that is most correct in 
light of the inventor’s intent, motivated by the public notice function of pa-
tents, uniformity, and judicial efficiency.210 In contrast, the BRI seeks to di-
vine the reasonable outer bounds of a claim’s scope.211 And where the BRI is 
usually prospectively employed before a patent issues, district courts operate 
retrospectively under a presumption of patent validity.212
Thus, the difference between the BRI and Phillips standards may seem to 
be a nuance, but it is real. Consequently, if issue preclusion is to be applied to 
IPR claim construction decisions, a solution is needed which reconciles the 
two standards.
IV. The “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” as a Preclusive 
Outer Bound on District Court Claim Construction
Can a theory of issue preclusion for claim construction be maintained in 
the face of the tension between the BRI and Phillips standards? This Part as-
serts that the “ordinary elements” of issue preclusion would be satisfied by 
treating the PTAB’s broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) of a patent 
claim term as a preclusive outer bound in subsequent district court claim 
construction. Section IV.A considers whether wholesale issue preclusion as 
to claim meaning is appropriate given the substantively similar practical out-
comes under both the BRI and Phillips standards. Section IV.B proposes an 
alternative outer-bounds preclusion theory that satisfies both the policy con-
siderations underlying claim construction as well as the principles of issue 
preclusion.
A. Wholesale Issue Preclusion as to Claim Construction is Inappropriate
Issue preclusion could apply to the entire content of a claim’s construc-
tion, rather than simply the outer bounds. The doctrinal and pragmatic simi-
larity of claim constructions under the BRI and district court standards sug-
gest this might be appropriate.213 It is tempting to rely on this similarity and 
to treat claim construction under the BRI and under Phillips as the same is-
208. See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1308 (cautioning against applying issue preclusion 
where usages not the same).
209. Id.
210. See Dolbow, supra note 198, at 1081.
211. See id. at 1081–83.
212. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (presumption of validity); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) (discussing common law origins of presumption).
213. See supra Section III.B.3.
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sue—after all, the outcome would likely be the same under either in many 
cases. But ultimately, such wholesale issue preclusion would be inappropri-
ate. The BRI and Phillips standard are analytically different and have sepa-
rate underlying policy goals.
The functionalist test for legal standard equivalence articulated in B & B
Hardware suggests that the two claim construction standards might be the 
same issue for preclusion purposes. Indeed, issue preclusion in the PTAB–
district court context arguably might make more sense than in the TTAB–
district court context, yet the Supreme Court endorsed the latter in B & B
Hardware.214 There, two different multifactor tests for likelihood of confu-
sion between trademarks were at issue. But Robert Bone and Barton Beebe, 
among others, have argued that the differences in likelihood-of-confusion 
standards among circuit courts are in fact not the same and produce “incon-
sistent formulation[s] and application.”215 Nonetheless, the Court found that 
“in essence” the same issue was being determined by the two tests at issue in 
B & B Hardware—whether two marks are likely to be confused.216 One could 
also argue that the PTAB and a district court are seeking “in essence” to de-
termine the same issue—what a patent claim term means—and are doing so 
largely using the same evidence with the same substantive results.217
This, however, would run contrary to the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence on the doctrinal basis of the BRI and Phillips standards themselves, as 
conveyed in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee.218 There, the Court con-
sidered whether the Patent Office could promulgate regulations requiring 
the PTAB to use the BRI standard, as opposed to Phillips, in IPR proceed-
ings.219 In holding such regulations to be proper, the court implicitly recog-
nized that the standards were doctrinally distinct. It noted that “inconsistent 
results” might be generated with two different standards in play but that the 
PTAB’s use of the BRI standard “helps to protect the public” by encouraging 
patents to be drafted narrowly.220
This doctrinal difference parallels the policy differences that underscore 
each standard.221 The BRI is concerned with encouraging narrow patent 
214. See supra Part II.
215. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a 
More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1307, 1308–09 (2012) 
(noting likelihood of confusion tests); accord Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifac-
tor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581, 1582, 1591 (2006).
216. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1306–07 (2015).
217. See supra Section III.B.3.
218. 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
219. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2142–46.
220. Id. at 2144–46.
221. See supra notes 210–212 and accompanying text.
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drafting by broadly interpreting claims when ambiguities are present.222 This 
standard, adopted not only by the PTAB in IPR but also by the Patent Office 
in both examination and reexamination, is primarily aimed at avoiding the 
anticompetitive effects of issuing patents with overbroad protection.223 In 
contrast, the Phillips standard has the technological practitioner in mind, di-
recting the court to resolve ambiguities as they would be resolved by a per-
son of ordinary skill in the art.224 The BRI standard thus applies to the patent 
in isolation; the Phillips standard occurs foremost in the context of the pa-
tent where a potentially infringing technology is also in question.
Nor are the equitable safety valves of issue preclusion law sufficient to 
endorse wholesale issue preclusion. These safety valves are largely based on 
questions of adequate procedure.225 Indeed, application of issue preclusion 
rules presupposes substantive identity of issues.226 But differences in applica-
tion of the Phillips and BRI constructions, when they exist, are based on 
questions of substance—that is, the possible difference between a claim’s in-
terpretive outer bounds and its operative meaning. Where these standards 
diverge, they do not diverge for procedural reasons.
Thus, while it is tempting to endorse wholesale preclusion, the stand-
ards’ differing policy justifications render this inappropriate. Deference 
might instead be fitting.227 Some district courts do treat PTAB claim con-
structions this way, affording them “reasoned deference” and requiring justi-
fication to depart from the PTAB construction.228 But wholesale preclusion 
is not suitable while the PTAB and district courts use formally different 
standards.229
222. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144–45 (“Because an examiner’s (or reexamin-
er’s) use of the broadest reasonable construction standard increases the possibility that the ex-
aminer will find the claim too broad (and deny it), use of that standard encourages the appli-
cant to draft narrowly.”).
223. See Dolbow, supra note 198, at 1082–83.
224. See id. at 1080.
225. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (Am. Law Inst. 1982) (enumerat-
ing exceptions to issue preclusion, including unavailability of review, differences in quality and 
extensiveness of procedures, differences in burden of persuasion).
226. See id. § 27.
227. A more nuanced discussion of deference in the framework of administrative pro-
ceedings in general, and claim construction in particular, is beyond the scope of this Note. See 
generally Gavin P.W. Murphy, Note, Revising Markman: A Procedural Reform to Patent Litiga-
tion, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1425, 1431–35 (2017) (discussing potential legal reforms to bolster court 
deference to the USPTO as a matter of administrative law).
228. See, e.g., Contentguard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Nos. 2:13-CV-1112-
JRG, 2:14-CV-61-JRG, 2015 WL 8073722, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2015).
229. Note that as of the time of this writing, the PTO has—in the wake of Oil States—
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking seeking to unify the PTAB’s claim construction with 
the Phillips standard. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims 
in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,221 (proposed 
May 9, 2018). Promulgation of this regulation would make wholesale issue preclusion palata-
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B. An Outer-Bounds Preclusion Theory: Embracing the Differences Between 
the BRI and Phillips Standards
The prescribed legal relationship between the BRI and Phillips standards 
enables the adoption of an issue preclusion theory wherein the BRI is preclu-
sive as an outer bound of a claim’s meaning in a later Phillips-governed pro-
ceeding—here deemed “outer-bounds preclusion.” Outer-bounds preclusion 
openly treats the BRI and the Phillips construction as two different issues.
As emphasized in the case law, there is a prescribed relationship between 
the BRI and the district court standard.230 The BRI may be broader than the 
district court construction.231 The BRI may be equivalent to the district court 
construction.232 But the BRI may not be narrower than the district court 
construction.233 Thus, because the district court standard may not be broad-
er than the BRI, it follows that the BRI should at least be preclusive as an 
“outer bound” of claim construction in a subsequent district court setting. 
The BRI and the district court claim construction standards can be viewed as 
two closely related “shells” of scope (e.g., two concentric circles) rather than 
two distinct and unrelated standards that sometimes overlap (e.g., the two 
circles making up a Venn diagram).
Under this theory, the PTAB’s BRI is preclusive in later litigation as to 
the broadest of all reasonable constructions. The district court then decides 
whether the Phillips construction is, too, the broadest reasonable one or 
whether a narrower reasonable construction is more appropriate. In other 
words, the PTAB’s determination is preclusive as to the issue of the BRI, in 
which the BRI is a subsidiary issue which preclusively determines the outer 
bounds, as a matter of law, of the separate issue of the Phillips construction. 
This embraces, rather than disguises, the doctrinal differences between the 
BRI and the Phillips standard while also accommodating their doctrinal and 
pragmatic similarities.
For example, consider the previously discussed claim term “computer 
display window.”234 One question might be whether, in the context of the 
claimed invention, such a display window needed to include a “graphical us-
er interface”—a narrower patent claim scope than if such a requirement were 
omitted. Suppose an IPR on the patent came first, and the PTAB found that 
the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term did include this re-
quirement. In a subsequent district court action, the patent owner would 
ble. The question of district-court preclusion based on the BRI, however, would likely remain 
for patents that had undergone an IPR under the old standard.
230. Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The 
broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may be the same as or broader than the con-
struction of a term under the Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”).
231. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Contentguard Holdings, 2015 WL 8073722, at *11.
233. Facebook, 582 F. App’x at 869.
234. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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then be able to argue for a narrower interpretation (e.g., that the window in-
cluded a “graphical user interface” and a “glass screen”) but not a broader 
one (e.g., that the window did not require a “graphical user interface” at all).
A litigant might object that issue preclusion is inappropriate because the 
PTAB could get the determination of the BRI wrong, perhaps due to legal 
error or specific procedural inadequacies. Ordinary preclusion law, however, 
offers equitable safety valves to account for this possibility.235 A patent owner 
who felt that the PTAB erred in its BRI but who, having prevailed at the 
PTAB, was unable to appeal the construction, could point to the unavailabil-
ity of review or a material procedural difference in her specific case as a rea-
son to depart from preclusion.236 Importing existing issue preclusion case 
law into the PTAB context—as the Supreme Court did in the TTAB con-
text237—also imports these equitable safety valves and accommodates fore-
seeable objections to preclusion. Additionally, claim construction determi-
nations by the PTAB are reviewable by the Federal Circuit, providing for le-
legal review by an Article III court.238
Outer-bounds preclusion would further policy aims of claim construc-
tion and the patent system in general. In applying the BRI preclusively as an 
outer bound, a patent owner would be prevented from improperly benefiting 
from “Schrödinger’s patent.” A narrow construction in a validity analysis at 
the PTAB would prevent a broader construction in an infringement analysis 
in district court, for instance. Preventing such oscillation would vindicate the 
public notice function of patent law, as well as further the notion that a pa-
tent should have as unified a meaning as possible across jurisdictional set-
tings.239 Indeed, not applying preclusion in this way could be harmful. If a 
patent owner were allowed to broaden their patent’s coverage beyond the 
“broadest reasonable” scope, a technological practitioner (i.e., potential in-
fringer) might detrimentally rely on the supposed “broadest reasonable in-
terpretation” of a previous IPR proceeding on that patent.
Thus, the outer-bounds preclusion theory is consistent with the policy 
concerns at issue. It is aligned with the purpose of the AIA, the policy ra-
tionale behind claim construction doctrines, general principles of judicial 
economy and procedural fairness, and the Supreme Court’s seemingly func-
tionalist issue preclusion jurisprudence.
235. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (Am. Law Inst. 1982).
236. See id. § 28(1) (providing for exception to issue preclusion where review of first de-
cision unavailable); id. § 28(3) (providing for exception to issue preclusion for reasons of pro-
cedural inadequacy).
237. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015).
238. See, e.g., ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (delineat-
ing standard of review).
239. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7 (examining varying scope of patent rights in 
various law patent law doctrines (validity, infringement, defenses) and arguing for an integrat-
ed doctrine of scope); Lemley, supra note 29, at 110 (arguing for a fixed meaning of patent 
terms over time).
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Conclusion
The scope of patent rights is central to various Article I and Article III 
proceedings, but preclusive effect is not consistent across these settings. This 
increases the ex ante uncertainty of patent scope. So far, despite the estab-
lishment of the PTAB as a specialist body for adjudicating patent validity, 
courts have been hesitant to afford preclusive weight to PTAB claim con-
struction prior to appeal. The Supreme Court’s articulation in B & B Hard-
ware of a functionalist two-step test for issue preclusion invites the applica-
tion of this doctrine to the context of patent claim construction by the 
PTAB. The conflict between the two distinct legal standards for claim con-
struction at district court and PTAB proceedings can be resolved by applying 
an “outer-bounds preclusion” theory wherein the PTAB’s “broadest reason-
able interpretation” serves as an outer bound for a patent’s scope in subse-
quent litigation. Doing so would be consistent with the public notice func-
tion of patent law and would decrease the variability of a patent’s scope 
across proceedings.
